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CHINA, SOUTH ASIA & NUCLEAR TESTING 
• — - - - .. .. . 
Reassessing mutual concerns 
By ARVIND KUMAR AFTER India detonated five nuclear devices of different varieties and yields a few 
weeks back Pakistan responded 
by testing six. An impression was 
created that it would go for fur-
ther testing if required. China, a 
major power in the Asian region, 
has been closely monitoring all 
these developments in the subcon-
tinent. 
When India tested, China react-
ed sharply and emerged with a 
strong condemnation, uniting and 
mobilising the other members of 
the P-5 viz. the US, Russia, UK and 
France. However, there was an ob-
vious lack of unanimity on the 
issue of collective condemnation 
and sanctions among the group of 
nuclear weapon States. This be-
came evident at Birmingham 
where the Group of Eight (G-8) 
industrialised countries held their 
summit and discussed the future 
of their ecoaomies. 
All the members, including Rus-
sia (which is a new entrant, in-
itially it was called G-7) diverted 
their attention from the future 
scenario to India's testing. It was 
of course pleasantly surprising for 
India to find that eventually 
France, UK and Russia did not 
come out with any strong condem-
nation. 
Major question 
The G-8 again met in London 
last fortnight to discuss the future 
scenario in the subcontinent after 
nuclear tests. The "London com-
munique" reveals the fact that the 
industrialised nations are deter-
mined to maintain their monop-
oly in every sector. It was made 
more obvious at the meet that the 
existing nuclear powers would not 
allow anyone to gatecrash into 
their exclusive club. The de facto 
nuclear weapon States are 
worried about the G-8 moves and 
•their strategies about their reten-
tion of the nuclear weapons. How 
the G-8 nations, who possess 90 per 
cent of the world's nuclear 
weapons, technology and material, 
plan to move forward with the 
abolition of nuclear weapons and 
control of fissile material and tech-
nology is a major question in the 
debate going on among the ana-
lysts and researchers working in 
the field. 
Muted response 
While the US and other 
industrialised countries were busy 
dealing with the sanctions and 
other measures against India, Pak-
istan failed to exercise restraint 
on its own part. The world was 
watching closely because it has 
been told of the brittle attributes 
of Indo-Pakistani relations. 
China's reaction to Pakistan's det-
onations was not as critical as it 
was regarding India's. Indeed, 
Pakistan got a relatively muted re-
sponse as far as criticism went. 
Among other things it tended to 
confirm that Pakistan has more 
clout than India abroad and can 
project its image more skilfully 
than India does. 
This happened though no one 
expected Pakistan to test the nu-
clear devices at such short notice. 
It is interesting to note that Pakis-
tan thinks it has equalled the 
number of tests with India but has 
forgotten that nuclear testing is 
not like playing cricket in which 
the team that scores more runs 
wins. 
However, in the present context, 
it would still be unwise to dismiss 
Pakistan's capability. India, in-
stead of not accepting the indigen-
ous capability of Pakistan, should 
emphasise and evolve a strategy 
based on the premise that Pakis-
tan possesses the technology, irre-
spective of its origin. This would 
help India in future. 
In fact the time is propitious for 
India to capitalise on the point 
that Pakistan has all the capabilit-
ies. In the 1990s, India was subject-
ed to challenges which made it in-
creasingly difficult for the govern-
ment to manage a coherent nu-
clear strategy. These included 
arms control initiatives designed 
specifically to contain India's ca-
pacities to develop a modern nu-
clear force to meet its security re-
quirements. These had to be dealt 
with without impinging on the nu-
clear weapon States' abilities to re-
tain and modernise their strategic 
forces. These considerations were 
explicit in the indefinite extension 
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty of 1995, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty of 1996 ( which 
still needs the approval of India, 
Pakistan and North Korea) and 
the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT), which is in the making. 
At the same time, Pakistan de-
clared its nuclear weapons capa-
bility and demonstrated its poten-
tial to launch nuclear strikes 
against targets deep into India. On 
its part, China continued its co-op-
eration with Pakistan without 
drawing penalties from the non-
proliferation advocates. 
Ultimate provocation 
India could have tested earlier 
when China and France renewed 
their nuclear test programme after 
the non-nuclear weapon States 
had obliged the nuclear weapon 
States with an indefinite extension 
of the NPT in 1995. India also had 
an opportunity to go for testing 
when it blocked the CTBT in 1996. 
The resumption of sub-critical 
tests in the US in 1997 also provid-
ed grounds for testing in India. 
Last, but not the least, the 'Ghauri' 
missile test by Pakistan with clan-
destine help from China turned 
out to be the ultimate provocation 
for India to test. 
But now it is time that India 
presses for total nuclear disarma-
ment. This task is, however, too 
difficult to accomplish because the 
Big-5 have a different agenda. 
It is true that India was not able 
to convince the international com-
munity about the reasons for 
testing apart from the threat per-
ception from China and the grow-
ing Sino-US-Pak nexus. It is a chal-
lenge to India's diplomatic com-
munity to make others understand 
why India had to undertake such 
tests. Convincing explanations are 
yet to come. 
No point in hostility 
There has been a downslide in 
Sino-Indian relations because of 
the explicit statements made by 
some decision-makers in India. 
Yet there is still no point in main-
taining hostility with China, 
among other reasons, because 
China's nuclear and missile capa-
bilities outstrip those of India's , 
which has neither the nuclear fire-
power nor the delivery systems to, 
pose a serious threat to the Chin-
ese heartland. China, on the other 
hand, possesses the ability to 
wreak intolerable devastation on 
India. 
The need of the hour, therefore, 
is not to adopt a confrontationist 
approach but to nurture relation-
ships in which both sides 
understand each other's concerns. 
The time has come to understand 
the compulsions under which pol-
icies are formulated and how sov-
ereignty and national interests 
can continue to be protected. 
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